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PLEASE CHECK ONE—MALE OR FEMALE?:
CONFRONTING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION
IN COLLEGIATE RESIDENTIAL LIFE
I. INTRODUCTION
The greatest threat to the identity of transgender youth in
transition is the lack of support from peers and superiors.1 The issues involving gender identity that transgender students face are
ripe for discussion on college and university campuses, particularly when schools assign housing according to sex but not gender
identity.2 The binary approach to gender on campus creates difficult questions, challenges, and situations for transgender students who may suffer from discrimination regardless of the approach their schools take to address transgender issues. While
some courts have determined that laws that prohibit sex discrimination also prohibit discrimination based on gender identity,
other courts have disagreed or have not ruled on the issue.3 However, the recent passage of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act underscores the urgent need to address such discrimination at the
local level, particularly on campus.4
While litigation in this field has rarely involved colleges and
universities, collegiate environments are often the “forefront for
social activism,”5 so it is likely the issue of transgender housing
discrimination will soon explode on campus. It is now critical that
colleges, universities, and the counsel who represent them either
prepare to address these issues when they arise or explore possibilities to preempt the legal issues that will surely arise at their

1. See Amanda Kennedy, Note, Because We Say So: The Unfortunate Denial of Rights
to Transgender Minors Regarding Transition, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 287 (2008).
2. See discussion infra Part V.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See discussion infra Part III.C.
5. See, e.g., Francine T. Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, “Because of Sex”: The Evolving
Legal Riddle of Sexual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J.C. & U.L. 361, 362 (2006). Housing issues
stemming from diverse sexual identities need to be explored and addressed as well, but
are outside the scope of this comment.
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schools. Part II of this comment discusses the legal definition of
transgender. Part III examines the history of the treatment of
transgender persons in American courts, as well as their current
legal status. Part IV surveys how various residential facilities
house transgender youth, as well as how transgender needs affect
public restrooms and the legal issues these facilities have faced.
Part V reviews the approaches colleges and universities use to
address the needs and concerns specific to housing transgender
youth. Part VI analyzes the legal issues that may arise from
these methods by examining the legal challenges faced by residential facilities. Part VII concludes with the measures college
and university administrators and lawmakers should take to
tackle the legal issues that concern housing transgender students, as well as the policies needed to protect transgender students.
II. WHAT IS TRANSGENDER?
While the Supreme Court of the United States has moved toward protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation,6
it is unclear whether this sort of protection would cover both heterosexual and homosexual transgender members of the Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (“LGBT”) community. Why not?
First, the term transgender does not have a universally accepted
definition. In this comment, the term transgender describes
people “whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs
from the sex they were assigned at birth.”7 Being transgender relates to gender identity and not sexual identity or preference.8 Although many transgender individuals identify as gay or lesbian,
many other transgender persons are heterosexual.9 The common
acronym LGBT is used too frequently as an “umbrella” term, and
so the unique experiences and challenges faced by transgender
individuals who are heterosexual may be ignored or forgotten.10

6. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (using the Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited government action at any
level designed to protect homosexuals against discrimination).
7. GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE 6 (7th
ed. 2007), available at http://www.glaad.org/Document.Doc?id=25.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network, One Umbrella, Many People:
Diversity Within the LGBT Communities (2003), http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLS
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In addition, modern medical theory describes a condition
unique to the transgender individual: Gender Identity Disorder
(“GID”).11 This clinical diagnosis has been reclassified as a sexual
disorder rather than a psychological one.12 A diagnosis of GID is
“a strong and persistent cross-gender identification” and a “persistent discomfort about one’s sex or a sense of inappropriateness
in the gender role of that sex.”13 The Supreme Court adopted this
standard for diagnosis in its definition of a transgender person in
Farmer v. Brennan.14 The Court defines a transgender person as
“one who has ‘[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels
persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,’ and
who typically seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change.”15 While
treating transgenderism as a medical disorder may increase the
likelihood for protection of the group as a whole, some transgender advocates reject this proposal because it labels their lifestyle as
diseased.16 Furthermore, it excludes those who have not sought,
or will not seek, medical treatment to become transsexual.17

EN_ATTACHMENTS/file/246-1.pdf.
11. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 532–38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (discussing the criteria for diagnosing patients with GID).
12. See id. at 532–33 (classifying GID under the “Sexual and Gender Identify Disorders” section). The section of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) entitled “Gender Identity Disorders” was replaced with the singular term “Gender
Identity Disorder” upon the release of the DSM-IV, and the term “transsexualism” was
eliminated. Compare id. at 532–38 (not using the term “transsexual”), with AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261–64
(3d ed. 1980) (classifying transsexualism as a “Gender Identity Disorder” within “Psychosexual Disorders”).
13. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 576 (4th ed. text revision 2000).
14. See 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
15. Id. at 829 (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989)).
16. See generally LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 1–79
(1998) (discussing a transgender person’s struggle for acceptance by society and his quest
to achieve social acceptance for transgender individuals as a whole).
17. For clarification, in this comment the term transgender refers to a person who
does not conform to traditional gender stereotypes and characteristics associated with the
person’s birth-assigned gender, who may or may not be seeking gender reassignment surgery or diagnosed with gender identity disorder. “Transgender” embraces all forms of challenging gender identity, of which transsexualism is just one aspect. While some of the cases discussed in Part III use the term transsexual, this comment uses the term transgender
in the discussion of these cases, for the purpose of simplicity as well as the form elimination of the term in DSM-IV. See generally DSM-IV, supra note 11, at 532–38 (refraining
from using the term “transsexual”).
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III. LEGAL TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER PERSONS IN AMERICA
In America, gender has not always been a binary construct.
Amerindian cultures both recognized and honored transgender
members of their communities.18 In these early American cultures, some individuals would assume a gender identity opposite
that predominantly associated with the genitals with which they
were born.19 However, colonial American culture reacted to this
practice with hostility, and some Amerindian communities abandoned traditions that embraced “two-spirit” people.20
Such colonial hostility toward transgenderism makes it seem
as though modern Western culture in America always abided by a
binary gender system. However, classical Western thought was
not always so clear-cut with respect to gender. As recently as the
late Renaissance period, from the fourteenth century to the sixteenth century, laws determined sex through an evaluation of
gender expression and looked at factors like clothing and behavior, not reproductive genitals.21
What led to the emphasis on biology rather than identity in
gender classification? An early case in American history demonstrates the change in gender philosophy in the New World. In
1629, at the twilight of the Renaissance and the beginning of the
Colonial period, the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia heard the case of Thomas(ine) Hall.22 Born in England, Hall
spent her childhood as Thomasine and wore girls’ clothing.23 At
age twelve, Thomasine went to live with an aunt in London, who
dressed her in boys’ clothes and called her Thomas.24 Dressed as a
man, Hall served in the military, but later returned to wearing
women’s clothing and performing “women’s work,” such as

18. LESLIE FEINBERG,
TO RUPAUL 21 (1996).

TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC

19. See id. at 21–29.
20. Id. at 21, 25–26. “Two-spirit” refers to the Amerindian concept of complex gender
identities. See id. at 21, 26–27.
21. Leane Renée, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals, Bipolar Categories,
and Law, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 343, 352 (1997).
22. Hasan Shafiqullah, Note, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An Argument for the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 195,
198 (1997).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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needlework and making bone lace.25 However, at age twenty, Hall
donned men’s clothing and sailed to the Virginia Colony, where
he switched his gendered apparel regularly.26 When the confused
colonists challenged this gender-bending behavior and went to
the authorities to sort out the situation, Hall asserted that s/he
was both a man and a woman.27 The court examined Hall’s genitals and determined Hall was intersex, so it required by mandate
that Hall wear both men’s and women’s clothing at all times.28
One can imagine this solution meant to reflect Hall’s intersex genitals.29 This may be the first American case where gender was
determined by genitals and biological sex, rather than gender
identity and expression.
A. Claims of Transgender Persons in Modern American Courts
1. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.30

While the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from discrimination based on biological gender, whether or not this protection
applies to discrimination based on gender identity is unclear. In
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment provides for the equal treatment of all citizens, especially those in the minority or belonging to a suspect
class.31 To determine whether unconstitutional discrimination exists with respect to a unique group, the Court has applied varia-

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (ordering Hall to wear men’s clothing and the headcovering and apron of a
woman).
29. See id. (describing Hall’s genitals).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (holding that justifications for discrimination based on gender must be “exceedingly persuasive” in order to be
valid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

1370

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1365

ble criteria. For example, the Court reviews discrimination based
on gender with heightened scrutiny.32 However, the Court has also been reluctant to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual minorities, such as transgender persons with non-conforming gender
identities.33
Despite this standard, transgender persons may still argue
they belong to a suspect class. The Supreme Court has used four
criteria to determine suspect class status: historical discrimination, immutability, political powerlessness, and disparate treatment not based on actual ability.34 First, “[t]he Court in Frontiero
v. Richardson emphasized that the immutability of a trait is determined largely by whether it is an accident of birth and thus is
virtually impossible to change.”35 It is possible a physiological disorder like GID is an immutable trait, and some federal courts
have acknowledged that gender identity is immutable because it
is a physiological or psychological condition.36 Second, the transgender community has also suffered a history of disparate treatment.37 Transgender people suffer from discrimination “in many
areas of life, from employment, housing, health care, and custody

32. Id. at 533 (describing the heightened review standard for gender-based classification).
33. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–99 (2003) (electing to protect homosexual conduct by incorporating such conduct into the right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Because the statute struck down in Lawrence
dealt with homosexual sodomy, not a categorical definition of the rights of homosexual
men as a group, the Court declined to analyze the case under the Equal Protection Clause,
choosing instead to address whether homosexual intimacy is protected by the Due Process
Clause. See id. at 574–75 (choosing to focus on overturning Bowers v. Hardwick instead).
34. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 686 n.17, 686–87 (1973) (applying
these criteria to find that gender is a suspect class).
35. Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access
Based on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the
Next Frontier of Equal Protection, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 902 (2007) (citing Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 686).
36. See, e.g., Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
transgender prisoner stated a cause of action for deprivation of medical treatment when
prison officials failed to provide treatment for gender dysphoria); White v. Farrier, 849
F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that transsexualism is a psychological disorder that
constitutes a “serious medical need”); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that a transsexual inmate stated a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment for the denial of medical treatment for her transsexualism); id.
37. See generally SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPHER DALEY, TRANS REALITIES: A
LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 3 (2003)
available at http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/trans/pdfs/Trans%20Realities%20Final
%20Final.pdf. Minter and Daley report on a survey in which “the people who completed
the survey face an array of legal challenges in expressing their gender identity due to bias
and ignorance regarding transgender issues.” Id.

2010]

CONFRONTING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION

1371

rights.”38 While transgender people may meet the criteria to belong to a suspect class, the Supreme Court is unlikely to bestow
suspect class status on the transgendered, since it has expressed
a disinclination to create new suspect classes.39
2. Title VII Claims
Because the Supreme Court is reluctant to assign suspect class
status to transgender persons, the fight against gender identity
discrimination has played out mainly through civil rights claims.
In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress announced that sex was not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees40 and at the same time sparked a debate in the courts over the meaning of the term “sex.”41 For clarity, “sex” usually refers to an individual’s biological identity
(chromosomal composition and reproductive organs), while “gender” usually refers to an individual’s social identity (the culturally
masculine or feminine characteristics the individual embraces).42
However, such claims had to overcome a number of challenges to

38. Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and
Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 253, 257 (2005).
39. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 & n.1 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the Court, in holding that an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution that precluded government action designed to protect the status of persons based on
their sexual orientation violated the Equal Protection Clause, used the rational basis test
and implicitly rejected the argument that the amendment infringed upon fundamental
rights of a suspect class); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–
43 (1985) (holding that the mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class and thus a zoning ordinance barring an assisted living center for such individuals was not subject to
strict scrutiny).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). This section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
41. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 362–63.
42. Id. at 362.
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succeed, as federal lower courts are reluctant to recognize transgender individuals as a protected class.43
First, the court in Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co. reasoned
that Title VII only protects employees from sex discrimination, so
it does not protect transgender employees from gender identity
discrimination.44 In this case, the plaintiff brought an action
against her former employer, alleging that her employer discriminated against her because of her sex, in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.45 In particular, Holloway alleged that
her employer fired her for initiating the process of a sex transformation.46 The court found the employee’s discharge did not violate due process and equal protection, since transgender persons
are not a suspect class.47
Next, the court in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. found that
Title VII’s use of the term sex referred to anatomical gender and
did not refer to those with GID.48 In Ulane, a transgender woman
sued her former employer for violating Title VII by firing her
from her job as an airline pilot.49 Although the district court found
in her favor, finding her employer discriminated against her as a
transsexual, the appellate court held that Title VII does not protect transgender persons.50
It was not long after the Holloway and Ulane courts drew the
line between sex and gender that the Supreme Court complicated
matters by blurring the line.51 Prohibiting discrimination based
solely on sex could lead to unnecessarily broad results, if it was
interpreted to “preclude discrimination based on human psychological and physiological characteristics, or on sexual orientation.
It might also be read to prohibit all workplace sexual behavior or

43. Elkind, supra note 35, at 906.
44. 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (The plaintiff did not claim discrimination based
on sex but rather because she chose to change her sex).
45. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
46. Id. at 661 & n.1.
47. Id. at 663–64 (“[T]he complexities involved merely in defining the term ‘transsexual’ would prohibit a determination of suspect classification for transsexuals.”).
48. 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 1082.
50. Id. at 1084–85. Even though Title VII is a remedial statute, the court found nothing in the legislative history of the act to indicate that Congress intended the legislation to
apply to “anything other than the traditional concept of sex.” Id. at 1085.
51. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–41 (1989) (using “sex” and
“gender” interchangeably).
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words and deeds having sexual content.”52 However, the Court
narrowed this broad spectrum in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
and ultimately found that Title VII covers discrimination based
on the notions, or traits and characteristics, stereotypically associated with one gender or another, and “acknowledg[ed] that enforcing a specific sex-gender match may be discrimination.”53 Although Price Waterhouse did not involve the issue of
transgenderism, the Court found that where a plaintiff in a Title
VII case proves “that the employer actually relied on [his or] her
gender in making its decision . . . stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part.”54 Following this
reasoning, courts have found that being transgender “is not fatal
to a sex discrimination claim” if the discrimination is due to nonconforming gender identity.55
In the landmark case of Smith v. City of Salem, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit continued the Title
VII analysis, finding sex discrimination present where an employer discriminated against a woman for not conforming to cultural gender norms, like wearing dresses and makeup, since it
“would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”56 Therefore, “employers
who discriminate against men because they do . . . act femininely,
are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”57 For example, the
court in Smith held that “[s]ex stereotyping based on a person’s
gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination.
. . .”58 Although the district court dismissed the claim in favor of
the employer in the Title VII action, the Sixth Circuit held that
employment discrimination based upon employee gender nonconformity is an actionable claim.59 The judge even went so far as
to hold that the allegations of discrimination sufficiently consti-

52. Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996).
53. Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment As Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 203–04
(2005); see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (“In forbidding employees to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sexual stereotypes.”)).
54. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51.
55. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 574.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 575.
59. Id. at 572.
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tuted a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause.60 Further, the Sixth Circuit also found in Barnes v.
City of Cincinnati that a transgender person is a member of a
protected class under Title VII.61
Unlike the previous standard, which focused on the sex of the
victim, the Price Waterhouse analysis emphasizes the state of
mind of the perpetrator when the discrimination relates to the
sex of the victim.62 Since Smith, a transgender plaintiff fired in
part because of her non-conforming appearance and behavior and
not just her transgender status, has been deemed to have a Title
VII claim.63 Similarly, in Schwenk v. Hartford the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined how the perpetrator’s actions stemmed from his belief that the victim failed to
act like a man.64 The court concluded that, under Price Waterhouse, sex under Title VII encompasses both sex and gender, and
it determined that the terms sex and gender are interchangeable,
even where both appear in the language of a statute.65 Therefore,
the court found Title VII forbids discrimination due to a person’s
failure to act in a way conforming to gender expectations.66
Even so, the Ulane reasoning remains influential, and Price
Waterhouse is not yet a generally applied standard.67 Courts have
found that the Price Waterhouse prohibition against sex stereotyping should not be applied to transgender persons.68 In addition,
other courts have ruled that Congress intended the term sex in
Title VII to refer to biological or anatomical characteristics, and
not gender identity.69 Courts that follow Ulane are merely following federal statutory authority, where, for example, Congress
specifically excludes transgender persons from antidiscrimination

60. Id. at 576–77.
61. 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005).
62. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
63. Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01CV1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *2,
*5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001). The court conceded the complexity of the “seemingly
straightforward” question of whether Title VII’s prohibitions apply to transsexuals. Id.
64. 204 F.3d at 1202.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (following the reasoning that “sex” refers to biological male or biological female anatomy).
68. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).
69. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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protections by way of the definition section of laws such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act70 and the Rehabilitation Act.71
Because most federal courts are still reluctant to extend protection to transgender persons without specific congressional intent,
statutory protection is necessary for the protection of transgender
individuals and the promotion of equality.
In sum, the weight of authority points to discrimination under
Title VII when it results from sex stereotyping and not an individual’s status as transgender. Also, most courts accept that sex
stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination forbidden by Title
VII. Finally, courts have held that “transgender” is not a subcategory of persons protected under the term sex in Title VII, though
transgender persons may be able to make Title VII claims if the
discrimination is due to sex stereotypes. However, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) was introduced in Congress on June 24, 2009.72 If ENDA succeeds, it will protect employees from gender identity discrimination in the workplace, and
Congress will send a clear message of support for the equal rights
of transgender persons.
3. Title IX Claims
Some courts have used the Title VII analysis to examine claims
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.73 For example, a court held that harassment based on masculine gender
stereotypes constituted a cognizable claim of sex discrimination
under Title IX, even though Title IX does not protect against sexual orientation discrimination.74 In another case, a court found
discrimination under Title IX where a student admitted to New
York University as a female was in the process of becoming female at the time a professor sexually harassed her.75

70. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2006).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i) (2006).
72. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009).
73. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 390–91.
74. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (D. Minn.
2000).
75. Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 248–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Schroeder
ex rel. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 879–80 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(holding a jury could determine that defendant’s failure to punish harassment based on
perceived sexual orientation was motivated by plaintiff’s sex within the scope of Title IX);
Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg’l Sch. Dist., No. Civ. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, at *4
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B. State and Local Antidiscrimination Statutes
Many states do not legally protect transgender people in their
hate crime and antidiscrimination statutes, even where states
grant such protections to gays and lesbians.76 The twelve states
and the District of Columbia that do address the issue of gender
identity discrimination have used a variety of approaches to find
that discrimination against transgender persons constitutes sex
discrimination.77 For example, New York courts have demonstrated a willingness to protect transgender rights once given sufficient statutory authority by the state’s 2002 antidiscrimination
amendment.78 In addition, 109 cities and counties now have laws
prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity.79 Most legislative action prohibiting gender identity discrimination occurs at
the local municipal level.80 Many municipalities amended local
ordinances to include transgender persons or established new
categories of protection.81 However, at the time of this writing, it
appears that California is the only state that explicitly protects
transgender students from discrimination and harassment.82

(D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001) (holding allegations that perpetrators’ harassment was based on
sex-based stereotypes were actionable under Title IX).
76. See generally National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Hate Crime Laws in the U.S.,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/hate_crimes_7_09_color.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010). While thirty-one states’ hate crime laws include crimes based on
sexual orientation, only the laws of twelve states and the District of Columbia protect
transgender individuals by including crimes based on gender identity. Id. As of the time of
this writing, thirteen states and the District of Columbia ban discrimination based on both
sexual identity and gender identity. See National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_map
s/non_discrimination_7_09_color.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
77. See Elkind, supra note 35, at 914; Samantha J. Levy, Comment, Trans-Forming
Nations of Equal Protection: The Gender Identity Class, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
141, 149–50 (2002).
78. McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 526–27 (N.Y. 2004) (finding the
amendment “eras[ed] any doubt” that the law protected transgender persons).
79. Transgender Law & Policy Institute, U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting
Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Expression, http://www.transgenderlaw.
org/ndlaws/#maps (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
80. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 403.
81. Id.; see, e.g., Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 Civ. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at
*8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (holding that transsexuals are protected from discrimination
under city human rights laws); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 391–93
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (considering a transsexual’s rights under city administrative code);
Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737, 739–40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (challenging
an ordinance prohibiting discrimination on basis of gender identity and sexual orientation).
82. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66251 (West 2000) (“It is the policy of the State of Califor-

2010]

CONFRONTING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION

1377

C. Federal Transgender Rights Under the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act
Despite the limited state statutory protections for transgender
persons, the issue of transgender rights has recently made huge
strides. On October 28, 2009, President Barack Obama signed a
federal hate crimes act into law, known as the Matthew Shepard
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (“HCPA”), the
first law to protect transgender persons.83 This Act expands the
1969 federal hate crime legislation, which only protected those
engaging in federally protected activities, like voting or going to
school.84 The HCPA gives the Department of Justice the power to
investigate and prosecute bias-motivated violence by granting it
jurisdiction over crimes of violence where the victim was selected
based on race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, or gender identity.85 It also authorizes the
provision of grants for local programs to combat hate crimes
committed by juveniles.86 The National Center for Transgender
Equality identified the three greatest roles the HCPA will play
for the transgender community: (1) “educat[ing] law enforcement
about the frequent hate violence against transgender people and
the need to . . . address it;” (2) “provid[ing] federal expertise and
resources . . . to overcome a lack of resources or willful inaction”
on the state or local level; and (3) “help[ing] educate the public
that violence against anyone . . . is unacceptable and illegal.”87

nia to afford all persons, regardless of their sex, ethnic group identification, race, national
origin, religion, mental or physical disability, or regardless of any basis that is contained
in the prohibition of hate crimes set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 422.6 of the Penal
Code, equal rights and opportunities in the postsecondary institutions of the state.”). At
the time of this writing, the Massachusetts Senate has on its docket for 2009–2010 an act
concerning gender-based discrimination and hate crimes, though the future of the act is
unclear. MASS. STATE SENATE, SENATE DOCKET BILL COMMITTEE REFERENCE 17 (2009),
available at http://www. mass.gov/legis/SenateDocket BillCommitteeReference.pdf.
83. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
111-84, §§ 4701–4713, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009).
84. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006));
National Center for Transgender Equality, It’s Official: First Federal Law to Protect
Transgender People, http://www.archive.constantcontact.com/fs010/1100409733839/arch
ive/1102765237249.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
85. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, supra note 83, § 4704(c) (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 4705.
87. National Center for Transgender Equality, supra note 84.
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IV. TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN SEX-SEGREGATED
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES
While many forms of discrimination have declined, more subtle
forms of discrimination reveal underlying prejudices.88 In the
gender identity context, most institutions do not have formal policies in place to indicate what criteria determine whether a person
can live in the residence of their gender identity rather than their
“birth-assigned” gender.89 Despite the complexities discussed in
this comment, these facilities may just assume that sex is a
“cleaner category.”90 Often, untrained intake staffers make the initial determination about what characteristics place a resident in
male or female facilities.91
While using these categories to separate residents does not appear to have a “sinister purpose” on its surface, the underlying
rationale seems to rely on the belief that sex segregation decreases violence.92 Sex-segregated facilities like shelters and bathrooms
are “necessary to daily survival,” and prisons and school dorms
are often mandatory, so placement contrary to gender identity
can result only in psychological damage, but also in a physically
dangerous situation.93 These gender classification rules have become the “heart of many controversies regarding the rights of
transgender people” in many areas, including education.94 These
controversies frequently reveal those underlying prejudices about
transgender people, such as the stereotype that they are “impos-

88. William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional Roles: The Fate of the
Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means for Congressional Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 74–75 (2009).
89. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 775 (2008).
90. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1350 (2009).
91. Spade, supra note 89, at 775.
92. Amara S. Chaudhry, Lessons from Jim Crow: What Those Seeking SelfDetermination for Transgender Individuals Can Learn from America’s History with Racial
Classification Categories, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 505, 507 (2009).
93. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[A] child who is in the
state’s custody has a . . . right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions on
. . . [his or her] emotional well-being . . . [since] traumatic experiences can have an indelible effect upon their emotional and psychological well-being.”); Spade, supra note 89, at
776.
94. See Dean Spade, Compliance Is Gendered: Struggling for Gender SelfDetermination in a Hostile Economy, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 219, 229 (Paisley Currah et
al. eds., 2006); Spade, supra note 89, at 776.
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ters” or “sexual predators.”95 Therefore, the policies for classification arise from fear, not an actual documented decrease in violence where the sexes are segregated.96 Ultimately, prohibiting
gender identity discrimination will prevent facilities from forcing
their transgender residents to live in environments hostile to
their current gender identity.97
In practice, jurisdictions that protect against gender identity
discrimination provide resources and regulations to guide these
sorts of decisions in facilities housing transgender people.98 However, even these measures are not enough since advocates report
a lack of awareness or failure to comply with guidelines, meaning
they “are generally under-enforced.”99 However, since so few jurisdictions have these sorts of gender identity-inclusive antidiscrimination laws, there is little legal guidance for these issues.100
These gender-segregated facilities often place transgender
youth “in homes that do not conform to their gender identity because policy dictates that members of different biological sexes
cannot dorm together.”101 Lack of social acceptance for transgenderism among the other youth may create safety concerns due to
lack of social acceptance.102 “There is also the risk of psychological
harm due to denial of the youth’s gender identity.”103

95. Spade, supra note 89, at 776–77.
96. Chaudhry, supra note 92, at 507.
97. See Rudy Estrada & Jody Marksamer, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
Young People in State Custody: Making the Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems
Safe for All Youth Through Litigation, Advocacy, and Education, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 415,
423 (2006) (describing the disapproval transgender youth receive from their caretakers);
Spade, supra note 89, at 776.
98. Spade, supra note 89, at 777; see, e.g., N.Y. CITY COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
GUIDELINES REGARDING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION: A FORM OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7 (2006), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/pdf/GenderDis_English.pdf; S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N,
COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES TO PROHIBIT GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION (Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.sf-hrc.org/index.aspx?page=29.
99. Spade, supra note 89, at 777.
100. Id.
101. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 287 (citing Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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A. Foster Care and Youth Shelters
Since transgender youth are more likely to face situations like
family rejection, lack of school access, and difficulties with social
services, the need to have access to facilities like foster care and
shelters is great.104 In general, homeless shelters assign residents
by biological sex, not gender identity.105 This “common sense”
practice defines gender under the assumption that “gender is assigned at birth and remains the same permanently.”106 This approach is a common practice, as evidenced by campaigns against
shelters demanding written policies allowing gender identity
placement.107 For example, campaigns waged in Boston and New
York resulted in laws clearly indicating that forcing a person to
use a facility that did not comport with his or her gender identity
was unlawful discrimination.108 Prior to these campaigns, the targeted shelters placed “transgender women in men’s shelters and
transgender men in women’s shelters.”109
However, there are still few alternative policies to assigning
placement based on sex rather than gender identity, and they
“tend to be informal and inconsistently applied.”110 For example,
the largest youth shelter in New York City, Covenant House,
sometimes “allow[s] transgender girls to live in their girls’ dorms,
but [this sort of accommodation] is inconsistent.”111 Unfortunately,
facility staffs sometimes harass transgender youth and fail to
protect them from harassment and violence by other youth.112
104. Bryan N. Cochran et al., Challenges Faced by Homeless Sexual Minorities: Comparison of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Homeless Adolescents with Their Heterosexual Counterparts, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 773, 773–74 (2002); Dean Spade, Keynote
Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal Landscape, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 353, 358 (2009).
105. Spade, supra note 89, at 778.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see, e.g., Ellen J. Silberman, Mayor Set to Approve Transgender Protection, B.
HERALD, Oct. 24, 2002, at 3; N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HOMELESS SERVS., PROCEDURE NO. 06-131 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.srlp.org/files/DHS_trans_policy.pdf.
108. TURNER, supra note 107; NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HOMELESS SERVICES, supra
note 107.
109. Spade, supra note 89, at 778.
110. Id. at 779–80.
111. Id. at 780. Spade conducted a series of trainings on transgender antidiscrimination for Covenant House in 2003 and 2004, forming a relationship with the organization
and learning about its continual difficulties with staff discrimination against transgender
youth and placement of transgender youth. Id. at 780 n.248.
112. Id. at 780.
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Homeless transgender juveniles often face verbal and physical attacks in shelters, especially where beds are assigned according to
sex and not gender identity.113 While some foster care systems
created new policies in response to lawsuits alleging discrimination, no system has created a policy that clearly protects transgender youth from placement in facilities contrary to their gender
identity.114 Since birth-assigned gender placement is still the
“common sense” method, new policies do not always guide the actual administrative practices.115 Therefore, for some transgender
youth, living on the street may sometimes be a more comfortable
option than a shelter if a shelter does not support and protect the
gender identity of its residents.116
New York has also found that transgender juveniles diagnosed
with GID qualify as disabled under New York’s Human Rights
Law.117 Therefore, a court found that under state human rights
law, the foster care home that housed the transgender youth
plaintiff discriminated against the youth by requiring her to adhere to the dress code, which prohibited her from dressing as a
woman, based on her biological gender.118 The court found the foster care facility needed to reasonably accommodate the disability
of the plaintiff and exempt her from the dress code.119 However,
the court also stated that it is “well established that a disabled
person is not entitled to a [sic] accommodation that would jeopardize the health and well-being of others.”120
Even so, the court distinguished between the adverse treatment of people with disabilities based on a real need for protection, as opposed to overbroad generalizations used to justify discrimination.121 In this case, the foster care home asserted that its
dress policy was necessary to protect the residents and staff, as

113. ROB WORONOFF ET AL., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, OUT OF THE
MARGINS: A REPORT ON REGIONAL LISTENING FORUMS HIGHLIGHTING THE EXPERIENCES OF
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUESTIONING YOUTH IN CARE 37 (2004),
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/culture/outofthemargins.pdf.
114. Spade, supra note 89, at 780.
115. Id. at 778–79.
116. WORONOFF, supra note 113, at 37.
117. Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846, 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
118. Id. at 855–56.
119. Id. at 856 (noting that the exemption applies “to the extent it bars her from wearing skirts and dresses”).
120. Id. at 854 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 73–74 (2002)).
121. Id. at 854–55.
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“there [were] many boys who [were] not emotionally mature and
who [felt] confused or threatened by the presence of a transgendered boy among them and [were] prone to act out when he [was]
nearby.”122 This argument did not persuade the court.123 In addition, the court found that even though other facilities for LGBT
youth existed, and one of these had ejected the plaintiff due to her
misconduct, their presence did not excuse her current facility
from reasonably accommodating her.124 The facility did not meet
its “obligation to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion . . . merely by
providing a small number of facilities [that treat] children . . .
with GID . . . nondiscriminator[ily].”125
B. Prisons and Juvenile Detention Facilities
States that have written policies regarding the placement of
transgender prisoners do not mention gender identity as a factor
in prisoner placement.126 Overall, since the majority of transgender people cannot or do not access genital surgery, genital or birthassigned gender rules result in the majority of transgender people
being placed in prisons inappropriate to their current gender.127
“For these prisoners, the application of birth-gender or genitalbased policies creates an urgent issue of personal safety.”128
Further, other issues specific to young people arise in juvenile
detention centers. In R.G. v. Koller, three LGBT juveniles, including one transgender youth, claimed equal protection violations.129
A juvenile correctional facility, which housed the three individuals in the past using isolation to protect the LGBT youths from

122. Id. at 855.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 855–56.
125. Id. at 856 (emphasis omitted).
126. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Admin. Regulation No. 637 (2005), available at http://
www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR637.pdf; Colo. Dep’t of Corr., Admin. Regulation
No. 700-14 (2005), available at http://exdoc.state.co.us/userfiles/regulations/pdf/0700_14.
pdf; Idaho Dep’t of Corr., Directive No. 303.02.01.002 (2003), available at http://www.corre
ctions.state.id.us/policy/int3030201002.pdf; Idaho Dep’t of Corr., Directive No. 401.06.03.
501 (2003), available at http://www.corrections.state.id.us/policy/int4010603501.pdf; Ill.
Dep’t of Corr., Admin. Directive No. 04.03.104 (2003); Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Directive
No. 04.06.184 (1993); Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 202.045 (2006), available at http://
www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/Document/202.045.htm.
127. Spade, supra note 89, at 782.
128. Id. at 782 & n.269.
129. R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133–34 (D. Haw. 2006).

2010]

CONFRONTING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION

1383

harassment, claimed their method was “reasonable and nonpunitive.”130 The court examined expert opinions and case law regarding the use of isolation on children, concluding that it was
not within the “range of accepted professional practices” and constituted punishment in violation of the plaintiffs’ due process
rights.131 In addition, the court criticized the facility’s failure to
implement other protection policies before resorting to isolation.132
The court also found that it is likely that teenagers would perceive isolation as a punishment for being LGBT, and that this
treatment only compounds the psychological harm.133 Finally, the
court concluded that the facility acted with “deliberate indifference” based on the totality of specific factors that the facility
failed to maintain.134 These factors included “(1) policies and
training necessary to protect LGBT youth; (2) adequate staffing
and supervision; (3) a functioning grievance system; and (4) a
classification system to protect vulnerable youth.”135 While the
court did not mean “to suggest that the constitution requires particular policies or safeguards,” the supervisory facility’s failure “to
adopt any professionally acceptable methods of maintaining order
and safety . . . constitutes deliberate indifference.”136
C. Bathroom Access
It is dangerous to assume that a sign on a door guarantees
safety, regardless of gender identity.137 If there is a threat to safety, steps should be taken to address the dangerous conditions for
everyone, rather than assuming sex segregation creates a safe
space.138 However, courts have found that the policy of allowing a

130. Id. at 1154.
131. Id. at 1154–55.
132. Id. at 1156 & n.12.
133. Id. at 1155.
134. Id. at 1157.
135. Id.
136. Id. (first emphasis added).
137. Video: Wrong Bathroom (Shani Heckman 2006), available at http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=yFDaYIsOWQk (“Does a sign on a door guarantee safety? I think there is a
danger assuming that it does.”).
138. Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications—Same-Sex
Marriage Is Just the Beginning: Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N.
KY. L. REV. 1, 39 (2009). “If a bathroom is a dangerous place, then people of the same sex
as the potential attacker are also in danger, and the government or institution should take
steps to alleviate the dangerous conditions for the potential same-sex as well as oppositesex victims.” Id.
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transgender female to use the women’s faculty restroom does not
create a hostile work environment where several alternate restrooms are available to female staff.139 Even so, in Cruzan v. Special School District, the plaintiff, a female teacher, argued that it
was judicial abuse “for a male judge to decide that reasonable
women could not find their working environment is abusive or
hostile when they must share bathroom facilities with a coworker
who self-identifies as female, but who may be biologically male.”140
However, “[n]o case law support[ed that] assertion,” and it is a
common practice for judges to decide “hostile environment sexual
harassment cases involving plaintiffs of the opposite sex.”141
Despite some courts finding transgender persons using the
bathroom of their gender identity appropriate, other courts hold
that transgender persons are required to use restrooms according
to their biological gender, even where laws prohibit gender identity discrimination.142 These cases are distinguished from Cruzan,
where a non-transgender person claimed that using a bathroom
with a transgender person created a hostile work environment,
since they involve transgender persons who claim that they work
in hostile environments because they have to use bathrooms
based on their sex, not their gender identity.143 The claims made
in these cases fail for the same reason Cruzan’s did: the conduct
of coworkers “was not of the type of severe or pervasive harassment required to sustain an actionable hostile work environment
claim.”144
V. HOUSING TRANSGENDER STUDENTS ON CAMPUS
Sex segregation in residential facilities and bathrooms is purported to prevent sexual activity and to preserve comfort, mainly
for non-transgender persons.145 However, sex segregation does not
eliminate sexual activity in these places, and certainly not in col-

139. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
140. Id. at 984.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2001); Hispanic AIDS
Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
143. See Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723; Hispanic AIDS Forum, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
144. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 726.
145. Spade, supra note 89, at 808–09; see also Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351,
353 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding sex segregation has a rational purpose).
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lege dormitories, but the argument that it does underlies the arguments for safety and comfort.146 The implication of genderneutral facilities often raises the issue of comfort,147 but the idea
behind comfort assumes that non-transgender women are safest
from violence in environments segregated from men or transgender persons.148
But does sex segregation really make people safe? Labels and
signs “do not function as locks” and can actually “create a false
sense of safe space.”149 In residential contexts, sex segregation indeed may create a false sense of safety, since sexual violence is
still present in sex-segregated facilities.150 For transgender persons, “sex-segregation itself [may become] a source of vulnerability for harassment and violence.”151 Furthermore, sex segregation
can be an obstacle to transgender people who need access to residential facilities that are sex segregated, like dorms.152
Most schools make dorm assignments according to a student’s
biological sex, and most dorms are segregated by sex in some
way.153 All students face changes, transitions, and new situations
when they begin college, but for transgender students, a housing
assignment can create an uncomfortable, unsuitable, or even unsafe situation.154 Some schools show awareness of these situations
by adopting strategies to address the concerns of transgender
students,155 but many institutions do not include gender identity

146.

Spade, supra note 89, at 809; see generally HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., OFFICE
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: WHAT
ARE DOING ABOUT IT 1–7 (2005), available at http://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf.
147. Spade, supra note 89, at 809–10; see also Video, supra note 137, at 4:37.
148. Spade, supra note 89, at 810. For example, the New York City Department of
Homeless Services shelter staff argued against a policy placing transgender women in a
women’s shelter because of “concerns about the comfort of non-transgender women in the
facilities.” Id.
149. Id. at 810; see also Video, supra note 137, at 4:37.
150. Spade, supra note 89, at 810; see also Gabriel Arkles, Safety and Solidarity Across
Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention, 18 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 524 (2009) (describing prison violence).
151. Spade, supra note 89, at 812.
152. Id. at 812–13.
153. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 408.
154. See id.
155. Id. These strategies include “gender-neutral hallways, all-gender or ‘gender blind’
residence halls, and mixed-gender suites.” Id.
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
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as a protected status in their antidiscrimination policies,156 and do
not address transgender needs in their housing assignment policies.157
Some school campuses enact policies that assign transgender
students to housing, which reflects their gender identity.158 The
residential life programs at these schools work with the students
on a case-by-case basis to accommodate their needs.159 Other colleges create gender-neutral housing options that assign students
as roommates regardless of gender,160 and other schools have developed “living-learning programs” or themed dorms that are
“trans-supportive.”161
When going to the bathroom means declaring a gender identity, gender non-conforming individuals face a difficult situation
and may avoid using public restrooms altogether.162 Since bathrooms on college campuses are public even in residences, more
and more schools are addressing the harassment and violence
transgender students may face in restrooms by creating genderneutral bathrooms,163 and some have gone so far as to adopt poli-

156. See Jordon E. Alexander, Implications for Student Affairs of Negative Campus
Climates for Transgender Students, 18 J. STUDENT AFF. 55, 56 (2009).
157. Id.
158. Brett-Genny Janiczek Beemyn, Transgender Law and Policy Institute, Ways That
U.S. Colleges and Universities Meet the Day-to-Day Needs of Transgender Students,
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/college/guidelines.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). Colleges
with these policies include, for example, Ithaca College, the Ohio State University, the
University of California at Riverside, the University of Minnesota, and the University of
Wisconsin. Id.
159. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 408.
160. Id; see, e.g., NAT’L STUDENT GENDERBLIND CAMPAIGN, COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES
THAT OFFER GENDER-NEUTRAL ROOMING 2–8 (2008), available at http://www.gender
blind.org/research.pdf (describing the gender-neutral rooming options at thirty-six colleges
and universities).
161. Beemyn, supra note 158. More than a dozen colleges and universities have established LGBT housing, including Beloit College; Carleton College, Syracuse University, Tufts University, the University of California at Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Riverside, and
Santa Barbara, the University of Colorado, Boulder, the University of Iowa, the University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, and the University
of Vermont. Id.
162. Video, supra note 137, at 5:10 (describing how bathroom situations at movie theaters can deter gender non-conformists from drinking Cokes during the movie).
163. See, e.g., N.Y.U. Single Occupancy Restroom List, http://www.nyu.edu/lgbt/rest
room.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); U. Tx. at Austin, Current Gender Neutral Restrooms, http://www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/gsc/gnrr1.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (providing the location of gender neutral restrooms for students); Brett Beemyn et al., Transgender Issues on College Campuses, 2005 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES 49, 51–
52.
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cies of renovation and construction that dictate that all buildings
have at least one gender-neutral bathroom.164 Co-ed bathrooms
exist across the country in college dorms with no reports of decreased safety or increased violence.165
Furthermore, public locker and shower rooms can be just as
“uncomfortable, intimidating, and even dangerous” as restrooms
for transgender students forced to undress in front of peers.166
However, schools like Ohio State University offer private “family”
changing rooms at their recreation centers, creating an alternative option for transgender students and anyone else wanting a
private place to change.167
Sex segregation in residential facilities and bathrooms can
create a “cultural ‘fault line,’” since “[v]ery few spaces in our society remain divided by sex.”168 For youth in transition who want
to avoid harassment or hassle, this fault line may seem deep.169
Students on many campuses have embraced gender-neutral facilities since “[l]ots of people don’t fit neatly” into the binary gender
system due to fluid identities.170 However, students are still wary
of risks that could lead to violence,171 so protection is necessary for
transgender youth on college campuses.
VI. LEGAL ISSUES WHEN HOUSING TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS ON CAMPUS
Some tentative legal guidance on how to address the concerns
of transgender students comes from The National Association of
College and University Attorneys (“NACUA”). NACUA attorneys
recommend creating designated residence hall floors for transgender students with co-ed bathrooms and dorm rooms, or reserv-

164. Beemyn, supra note 158.
165. Debra Baker, The Fight Ain’t Over, 85 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1999) (reporting that unisex bathrooms are in college dorms around the country); Archibald, supra note 138, at 39–
40.
166. Beemyn, supra note 158.
167. Id.; DEP’T OF RECREATIONAL SPORTS, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, RECREATION &
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY CENTER FACT SHEET 2, available at http://recsports.osu.edu/posts/docu
ments/rpac-fact-sheet.pdf.
168. Patricia Leigh Brown, A Quest for a Restroom That’s Neither Men’s Room nor
Women’s Room, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A14.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id.
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ing single occupancy rooms for transgender students, as many
schools have done.172 However, the cases discussed in Part IV provide examples of the legal issues that potentially arise on university and college campuses when it comes to using these methods
in residential housing. Like shelters and foster care homes, higher education administrators may need to reasonably accommodate transgender students suffering from GID. However, creating
mandatory separate housing for transgender students could psychologically damage students by making them feel isolated or punished for being transgender, as the court found in Koller.173 If
schools do not provide and enforce adequate and professionally
acceptable methods of maintaining order and safety, courts may
find the lack of policies and training to be deliberate indifference
on the part of the school.
It is not as clear what to do about dorm bathrooms, even as
many schools embrace gender-neutral bathroom facilities. Cruzan
showed that gender-neutral bathrooms may not create a hostile
environment for non-transgender students,174 but other courts
held that having to use the bathroom of one’s biological gender
did not create a hostile environment for transgender individuals.175 Guidance may soon come from the courts. At the time of
this writing, a non-transgender student at Green Mountain College in Vermont, Jennifer Weiler, has filed suit against her school
over gender-neutral bathrooms on campus and lack of alternates.176 It is not likely that Cruzan would persuade the court if
this suit goes to trial, since it seems all bathrooms available to
the student were gender-neutral.177 As more colleges adopt progressive policies, legal challenges to these policies may also arise
in backlash. In addition, there still are other legal concerns and
duties for universities housing transgender students.

172. Francine T. Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, Gender Identity and Expression Issues at
Colleges and Universities, NACUA NOTES, June 2, 2005, available at http://www.transgen
derlaw.org/college/NACUA.pdf; see supra Part IV.
173. R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1155 (D. Haw 2006).
174. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002).
175. See, e.g., Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2001) (finding no hostile
environment in a workplace discrimination case).
176. Scott Jaschik, A Bathroom of Her Own, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Dec. 21, 2009, http://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/12/21/bathrooms.
177. Id.
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A. State and Local Protection
Some states, like Massachusetts and New Jersey, have adopted
abuse prevention statutes, which protect against abuse by family
or household members.178 New Jersey has applied its statute in
the dorm context.179 Nicole M. Decker, in a comment published by
the Penn State Law Review, concluded that the Massachusetts
law should include college roommates because “[s]ociety needs
additional, not fewer, measures to combat domestic violence.”180 A
transgender student abused by roommates in university housing
may have a claim under such a statute, if present in that particular jurisdiction.
In addition, as of this writing, 282 colleges and universities
have non-discrimination policies that protect gender identity.181
What does this mean in a residential context, and do these policies create any real changes on campus? In a 2006 survey by
GLBT Campus Matters, most colleges and universities indicated
“that few changes had occurred as a result of the nondiscrimination policy.”182 Some of these colleges also had policies
against people of different genders sharing a room, and these institutions found establishing gender-neutral housing a difficult
task.183 A transgender student may complain to the school under
such a discrimination policy if the school does not have genderneutral housing or if the school assigns the student to housing
that does not conform to his or her gender identity. Further, since
the Sixth Circuit in Smith held that the Price Waterhouse rationale applies to transgender persons in areas outside of employment,184 it is possible that courts will find similar protection under
Title IX.

178. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, §§ 1–9 (2003 & Cum. Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–30 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
179. Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001).
180. Nicole M. Decker, Comment, An American Household: Massachusetts’ Abuse Prevention Act and Its Applicability to College Roommates, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1273, 1294
(2004).
181. Transgender Law & Policy Inst., 282 Colleges and Universities Have NonDiscrimination Policies that Include Gender Identity/Expression, http://www.transgender
law.org/college/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
182. Brett Genny Beemyn & Jessica Pettitt, How Have Trans-Inclusive NonDiscrimination Policies Changed Institutions?, CAMPUS MATTERS, June 2006, at 8.
183. Id.
184. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
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However, some may fight against antidiscrimination policies at
colleges and universities or similar protective measures. For example, on March 4, 2010, Virginia Attorney General Kenneth T.
Cuccinelli, II, sent a privileged letter to all of the presidents, rectors, and visitors of Virginia’s public colleges and universities declaring that they had no legal authority to adopt antidiscrimination policies that include not only gender identity, but sexual
orientation and gender expression as well.185 Cuccinelli advised
that the Commonwealth prohibits such language and classifications from inclusion as protected classes without “specific authorization from the General Assembly.”186 According to Cuccinelli,
this means state agencies like public schools cannot “reach
beyond the boundaries established by the General Assembly.”187
In addition, Cuccinelli criticized localities for including sexual
orientation and similar categories in their antidiscrimination policies—policies inconsistent with Virginia Attorney General opinions from the early 1980s.188
Cuccinelli concludes that schools including gender identity in
their antidiscrimination policies have done so without the proper
authority and have created “confusion about the law and, at
worst, a litany of instances in which the school’s operation would
need to change” to conform.189 Instead, Cuccinelli believes the
schools need to make changes to conform with “the law and public
policy of Virginia,”190 or at least with Cuccinelli’s interpretation of
public policy. The actions of the Attorney General “dismayed”
students and faculty members and revealed the tension between
liberal academics and conservative state leaders in Virginia.191 So
far, academic leaders from schools like the University of Virginia
and the College of William and Mary have commented on the issue, not only stressing that they will review their own policies,
but also underscoring the importance of their nondiscriminatory

185. Rosalind S. Helderman, Attorney General Asks Colleges to End Policies That
Shield Gays, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2010, at A1; Letter from Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney Gen., Commonwealth of Va., to Presidents, Rectors, and Visitors of Va.’s Pub. Colls.
and Univs. 1 (Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/
Cuccinelli.pdf.
186. Letter from Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, supra note 185, at 1.
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id. at 3–4.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id.
191. Helderman, supra note 185.
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values.192 While it is not clear what will happen if universities do
not heed Cuccinelli’s advice, “[t]hey call it advice for a reason” according to a former deputy attorney general.193
Therefore, Cuccinelli will probably need to take court action to
enforce his own opinion, even though college boards and visitors
swear to follow the law.194 Cuccinelli seems to believe that protections based on sexual orientation or gender identity are unnecessary, just as the Governor believes that “no Virginia college or
university . . . will engage in discrimination of any kind.”195 However, Democrat Mark Warner, former governor and now U.S.
Senator for the Commonwealth, believes that this sort of advice
will “damage the Commonwealth’s reputation for academic excellence and diversity.”196 Perhaps McDonnell at first denied the
need for protection from sexual orientation discrimination and
similar acts of intolerance to further his own agenda,197 since con192. Press Release, Taylor Reveley, President, Coll. William & Mary, No Discrimination at W&M (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.wm.edu/news/pressreleases/2010/no-discrimina
tion-at-wm.php (“[W]e need to review carefully the AG’s view as a matter of law and policy
. . . . For now, let’s be clear that William & Mary neither discriminates against people nor
tolerates discrimination on our campus.”); Statement by President Casteen: Governor
McDonnell’s Executive Directive Clarifies Nondiscrimination Policy (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/newsRelease.php?id=11230 (“But as rightly alarmed as
many of us and I myself were by last week’s Attorney General letter, . . . [l]et us hope that
the subsequent discussion will rise to the level of the [eloquence and clarity] struck in
[Governor McDonnell’s] directive.”). While neither school includes gender identity, they do
include sexual orientation in their anti- or non-discrimination policies. University of Virginia, Policy: Preventing and Addressing Discrimination and Harassment,
https://policy.itc.virginia.edu/policy/policydisplay?id=HRM-009 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010);
William and Mary Law School, Non-Discrimination Policy, http://law.wm.edu/careerser
vices/policies/index.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
193. Helderman, supra note 185 (quoting former Deputy Attorney General Claire
Guthrie Gastañaga).
194. Id.
195. Id. However, Virginia Senator Mark Warner is confused as to why Virginia’s Attorney General would “authorize our public colleges and universities to discriminate.”
Press Release, Sen. Mark Warner, Statement on Va. Attorney General’s Opinion on Nondiscrimination Issue (Mar. 5, 2010).
196. Helderman, supra note 185. Some speculate that Virginia schools will need to
amend their admissions materials “to put a big ole’ asterisk next to diversity to remind
prospective students that only straight students are welcome in Virginia.” Crazydrumguy,
Cuccinelli Orders Va. Colleges to Strip Sexual Orientation and Gender Identify from AntiDiscrimination Policies, http://crazydrumguy.com/2010/03/cuccinelli-orders-va-colleges-tostrip-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-from-anti-discrimination-policies/ (Mar. 5,
2010, 21:24 EST).
197. Va. Exec. Order No. 6 (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.governor.virginia.
gov/Issues/ExecutiveOrders/pdf/EO_6.pdf (rescinding the prior ban on state employment
discrimination which included a ban on sexual preference discrimination); Jim Nolan, Senate Backs Protection for Sexual Orientation; It Passes a Bill to Add It to the Anti-Bias Policies in State Hiring; Defeat in House Likely, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), Feb. 9, 2010, at
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trary to Cuccinelli’s argument that the Virginia General Assembly has never supported protecting sexual orientation, the Virginia Senate has supported adding sexual orientation to antidiscrimination policies.198
While an unlikely explanation, perhaps Virginia’s leaders see
progress on campus as an indicator that discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity is a non-issue on campus.
Social acceptance of transgender students is growing on college
campuses, as evidenced by the election of the first transgender
homecoming queen at the College of William and Mary.199 The
reaction of other students has been positive.200 One student described Vasold’s election as “cool,” since “it shows how our culture
is evolving, hopefully.”201 Also encouraging is the administration’s
low-key support, which Vasold sees as a promotion of student
“differences and similarities” that increase cultural understanding.202 The campus attitude at William and Mary shows that the
social movement to support and accept transgender persons is
growing on college campuses and foretells imminent social
change.203 As one William and Mary student put it, “It’s a general
change across the country . . . . We’re tired of the old way.”204 Even
so, Vasold’s parents still have concerns for her safety on campus.205 Rather than cite the social change students strive for on
campus as evidence that certain classes do not belong in antidiscrimination policies, colleges and universities should support
and protect their students and not de facto tolerate discrimination by refraining from including sexual orientation or gender
identity in their antidiscrimination policies. While public schools
in any state must conform at a local level with the state’s law and
public policy, to remain relevant and prestigious, institutions, col-

A10 (noting that a vote in the General Assembly was due to McDonnell’s decision “not to
issue an executive order that includes sexual orientation in the state’s anti-discriminatory
policy”).
198. Nolan, supra note 197.
199. Felicia Tsung, Transgender Homecoming Queen a First for College, FLAT HAT
(Williamsburg, Va.), Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.flathatnews.com/content/
71865.
200. Michael Paul Williams, Homecoming Queen at W&M: Diversity Reigns, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Oct. 29, 2009, at B1.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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leges, and universities should place a higher premium on the public policy directions at a national level, particularly the inclusion
of gender identity as a protected class in the HCPA.206
Possibly in response to the reaction to Cuccinelli’s letter,207
Governor McDonnell ultimately did decide to issue an executive
directive stating “discrimination against enumerated classes of
persons set forth in the Virginia Human Rights Act or discrimination against any class of persons without a rational basis is
prohibited.”208 However, this gesture is just a directive, not an executive order, so it does not carry the weight of law.209 McDonnell
could have included gender identity, sexual orientation, and
gender expression in Executive Order Six,210 or broadened his directive to include student protections. In an interview with The
Washington Post, he explained that “[t]he attorney general’s job is
to declare the law. It’s my job to set the policy and help the General Assembly set the policy.”211 Since the Governor and Attorney
General are aware of the political push and desire for gender
identity protection on college campuses,212 they should work in
their roles toward that policy.
B. Supervisory Liability for Schools
In 1996 a student brought an action against school officials alleging equal protection and due process violations due to the failure of school officials to protect the student from gender-based
harassment and harm by other students.213 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the

206. See supra Part III.
207. Jenna Johnson et al., Students Irate at Cuccinelli Over Gay-Rights Policies, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 2010, at B1.
208. Va. Exec. Directive No. 1 (2010), available at http://www.dhrm.virginia.gov/docu
ments/ExecutiveDirectiveOne.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.23901 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
209. Posting of Rosalind Helderman, McDonnell’s Nondiscrimination Directive Carries
Force of Office, Not Law, to Virginia Politics, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapoli
tics/2010/03/mcdonnells_nondiscrimination_d.html (Mar. 11, 2010, 7:52 EST).
210. Va. Exec. Order No. 6 (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.governor.virginia.
gov/Issues/ExecutiveOrders/pdf/EO_6.pdf.
211. Posting of Anita Kumar, McDonnell: No Special Counsel to Enforce Directive
Banning Discrimination Against Gays, to Virginia Politics, http://voices.washingtonpost.
com/virginiapolitics/2010/03/post_648.html (Mar. 17, 2010, 14:08 EST).
212. Rosalind S. Helderman, Cuccinelli Not Giving in on Colleges’ Gay Bias Policies,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2010, at B5.
213. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996).
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student could maintain equal protection claims of discrimination
based on both gender and sexual orientation.214 However, the
plaintiff in Nabozny v. Podlesny also argued that the “defendants
violated his right to due process by acting with deliberate indifference in maintaining a policy or practice of failing to punish his
assailants, thereby encouraging a harmful environment.”215 Both
the district court and the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument
because school employees did not perpetrate the harm suffered,
and the school officials had no duty to act and prevent the
harm.216
Even so, “[s]upervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act,” so officials who just
stand behind a deficient policy are still liable.217 Furthermore,
courts may impose supervisory liability if supervisors breach duties imposed by local laws.218 A student may make a claim under
the HCPA or under an antidiscrimination policy that includes
discrimination based on gender identity. Therefore, courts may be
willing to hold school officials liable when school policies or practices place students in dangerous environments, even when officials do not perpetrate the specific harm.
C. Recommendations
Colleges and universities must be flexible, and allow transgender students to choose the housing option with which they are
most comfortable, regardless of sex and gender identity. The current trend seems to be a rejection of separate housing arrangements for LGBT students.219 Some schools have cancelled plans
for themed housing for transgender or LGBT students.220 Texas
Christian University cancelled its plan for an LGBT “living learn-

214. Id. at 460.
215. Id. at 449, 460 (citing J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 273
(7th Cir. 1990)).
216. Id. at 453, 460–61.
217. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting
Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169–70 (5th Cir. 1985)).
218. O’Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1985).
219. See supra Part V.
220. Posting of Alison Go, TCU Cancels Plans for Gay-Themed Housing, to Paper Trail,
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/paper-trail/2009/04/15/tcu-cancels-plans-for-gay-themed-hou
sing.html (Apr. 15, 2009, 17:56 EST).
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ing community” because of concerns of separatism.221 Yale University tabled its plans for gender-neutral housing despite overwhelming student support because it wanted to form a task force
to study similar programs at peer schools such as Harvard, Stanford, Brown, and the University of Pennsylvania.222 Drew University rejected gender-neutral housing proposals because “the idea
had become too controversial.”223 While the administration initially supported the proposal, it “decided to err on the side of caution”
and just address the needs of each transgender student individually.224 This is an improvement from the previous arrangement,
which allowed students to request “medical singles,” which were
isolating and carried a stigma.225
Therefore, schools should focus their energy away from creating LGBT or transgender-themed housing, and instead find comfortable solutions for everyone by working on a case-by-case basis.
For example, schools like the University of Chicago allow upperclassmen to pursue living arrangements with whomever they
choose.226 This program allows students to “seek out the living arrangements that make them feel the most comfortable.”227 So far,
there have been no complaints, issues, or concerns with the program.228 This option appeals to a broad range of students beyond
the LGBT community, since there are added benefits to genderneutral housing, such as the ability to live with a relative of the
opposite sex or someone you already trust.229 At the University of
Connecticut, an experiment with gender-neutral housing allowed
siblings and friends who simply wanted to live with someone they
knew to have that freedom.230 Before implementation of the new

221. Id.
222. Posting of Alison Go, Yale Delays Gender-Neutral Housing, to Paper Trail,
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/paper-trail/2009/03/04/yale-delays-gender-neutral-housing.
html (Mar. 4, 2009, 17:56 EST).
223. Leslie Kwoh, Drew University Rejects a Proposal for a “Gender-Neutral” Dorm,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 7, 2008, at 40.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Dave Newbart, Men, Women, Share U. of C. Rooms; Male, Female Undergraduates
Can Now Share Dorm, No Questions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 6, 2009, at 4. Unfortunately,
first year students are still assigned same-sex housing. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Nikki Bussey, Colleges Test Water with Gender-Neutral Dorms, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), June 29, 2008, at M1.
230. Grace E. Merritt, Genders Mix in UConn Housing, Pilot Program to Expand in
Fall, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), May 26, 2008, at B1.
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plan, there was only one gender-neutral suite, and the students
who lived there felt isolated.231 Accordingly, schools should also
provide resources and training for residential advisors and educational opportunities for non-transgender students to foster a more
accepting environment.
However, privacy in the application process may become a concern. While most college admissions and housing applications are
separate, transgender students may identify strongly with one
gender, and feel most comfortable selecting that gender to live
with without disclosing their transgender status. For example,
Dartmouth declares on its housing application that it “seeks to
provide a living environment welcoming to all gender identities;
one not limited by the traditional gender binary.”232 Students have
the choice to disclose their gender identity and the third-person
pronoun that makes them feel the most comfortable.233 Even so,
for students who just want to be male or female, and not labeled
as transgender, this option might still not be enough to address
the issue. In gender-neutral or case-by-case housing, students
may feel more comfortable disclosing their needs and preference
for living arrangements.
In addition, schools will also need to anticipate the concerns of
all students and parents, and find solutions that do not result in
gender identity discrimination.234 For example, schools offering
gender-neutral housing should still offer students who prefer
same-sex roommates that option. While the solution is not simple,
most students enjoy the ability to live with whomever they want,
and appear to be adjusting to living with transgender students.235
231. Id. The new plan will add five more gender-neutral sites. Id.
232. Peter Schworm, Just Roommates: Colleges’ Final Frontier: Mixed-Gender Housing,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2008, at A1.
233. Id.
234. One situation that merits examination but is outside the scope of this comment is
the presence of transgender students at women’s colleges. This situation raises the question of whether those colleges can serve students who no longer see themselves as women.
See Alissa Quart, When Girls Will Be Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008 (Magazine), at 32.
Students at women’s colleges “chose[ ] to attend a women’s college in order to live and be
educated in the company of other women.” Id. at 35. Some alumni see the admission of
transmale students as a way of “passively going coed” and transmale students were “men
seeking to take advantage of Mount Holyoke’s liberal and accepting atmosphere.” Id. at
36. One graduate of Mount Holyoke, Suzanne Corriell, sees the difficulty of the situation,
since “when a student no longer identifies as a woman, the privilege to attend these
schools is lost.” Id.
235. See Sara Olkon, Next: Coed Dorm Rooms; In 2009, U. of C. Will Allow Students to
Have Roommate of Opposite to Sex—No Permission Needed, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 2008, at
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Learning to live with peoples’ differences is merely a part of the
broader socialization process experienced in college, and most
students will admit problems can come with any roommate, regardless of gender identity.236
VII. CONCLUSION
Gender identity issues will arise at the collegiate level, particularly in residence halls, given recent cases dealing with situations
in the workplace and similar residential settings.237 While the
trend to protect gender identity under Title VII is not overwhelming, the recent passage of the HCPA, and the recent inclusion of
gender identity in the proposed ENDA show that the trend is not
something that will soon go away. To send a message on this issue to the nation’s schools and face the new reality of gender in
America, the Department of Education should amend its Title IX
regulations to allow transgender students to live in single-sex
housing that conforms to their gender identity.
The ultimate measure Congress could take to protect transgender youth in college and university housing is to pass a bill
that explicitly protects students from discrimination and harassment based on their gender identity. While the HCPA specifically
addresses hate crimes, until Congress makes it clear to the courts
that people with non-conforming gender identities are a protected
class in all antidiscrimination laws, transgender persons will be
denied equal rights.
Katherine A. Womack *
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237. See supra Part IV.
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